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Crossing Borders and Criminalizing Identity: The
Disintegrated Subjects of Administrative Sanctions

Keramet Reiter

Susan Bibler Coutin

This paper draws on in-depth, qualitative interviews that examine individual
experiences in two different legal contexts: deportation regimes and supermax
prisons. Through putting these contexts and experiences into dialogue, we identify common legal processes of punishment experiences across both contexts.
Specifically, the U.S. legal system re-labels immigrants (as deportable noncitizens)
and supermax prisoners (as dangerous gang offenders). This re-labeling begins a
process of othering, which ends in categorical exclusions for both immigrants
and supermax prisoners. As individuals experience this categorical exclusion,
they cross multiple borders and boundaries—often against their will—moving
from prison to detention center to other countries beyond the U.S. border, and
from isolation to prison to “free” society. In both cases, the state action that subjects experience as punishment is civil and, therefore, nominally not punitive.
Ultimately, excluded individuals find themselves in a space of legal nonexistence.
By examining these common processes and experiences, we argue that a new
kind of subject is revealed: a disintegrating subject (as opposed to a juridical or
disciplinary subject) whose exclusion reinforces the power of the state.

“It is not crime that alienates an individual from society, but
that crime is itself due rather to the fact that one is in society
as an alien.” (Foucault 1977: 275–76)
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As Foucault’s quote suggests, there are deep connections
between criminalization and being treated as an alien or noncitizen: both are mechanisms through which individuals are
excluded from social membership and its benefits. Through analysis of interviews from two separate projects—one about longterm solitary confinement and the other about deportations to El
Salvador—we argue that illegalization and criminalization produce a new form of legal subject, which is neither a juridical subject governed by law, nor a disciplinary subject “responsibilized”
by punishment (Foucault 1977; Rose et al. 2006). Instead, the
subject is disintegrated through the imposition of severe sanctions—like solitary confinement and deportation—without access
to the legal protections traditionally accompanying punishment.
The two narratives juxtaposed below exemplify the legal production of this increasingly prominent form of subjectivity.
In 2010, one of us—Keramet—met with Max at a bench outside of a Starbucks, 40 days after he had been released from prison.
Max,1 who was 50 years old at the time of this interview, had spent
10 years in California’s Pelican Bay State Prison, where he had
been in solitary confinement, or “the hole,” in the Security Housing
Unit (SHU), a supermax. He described his experience:
One of the guys that . . . worked there [in the prison] . . . He
goes, “They’re talking about moving you . . . [to] the Hole.”
And I said, “For what?” And he goes, “I don’t know. So I see
the goon squad coming in.” So I just crashed through the
classification, and I walked in there, and I said . . . “You know
what? You’re going to lock me up; you have to give me a
reason . . .”
I’ll never forget that day. I said, “Lord, if you’re for real,
man, I turn my life over to you completely.” . . . And I went
straight to the SHU. I remember . . . they go up on a bus,
and it took forever to get there . . . I’m just looking at trees,
birds. And you see it’s a beautiful coast out there. Man, I’m
looking at it. I’m like—the big old pelicans and I’m trying to
get everything I can because I know that it’s over—that I
already have a life sentence. Then with another life sentence
in the Hole . . . And I was trying to look at everything—the
waves, everything. Then finally, we get to Pelican Bay . . . And
the best way I can describe the front of the entrance of the
SHU is it’s like—remember the old Star Wars movies? Hans
Solo’s ship—the big old glass vessel? It’s the first thing that
came into my mind right then and there. . ..

1

All interviewees have been given pseudonyms.
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When you’re sentenced to indeterminate SHU sentence,
you’re allowed to appear before the classification unit every
120 days . . .There’s no touching. You can’t touch each other.
You spend 23 out of the 24 hours—you can spend all 24
hours if you want in there, but I used to go out to my little
yard for an hour to work out . . . .

Two years earlier, the other of us—Susan—sat opposite Amilcar in the offices of a non-governmental organization in San Salvador, El Salvador. Amilcar, who was 24 years old at the time of
this interview, described how, even though he had been a lawful
permanent resident in the United States, he had been deported
to El Salvador:
In 2004, late 2003 or 2004, I caught myself a criminal case
. . . It was a DUI [driving under the influence], and when
they searched the vehicle, they found less than 30 grams of
marijuana in the car. That was just enough for them to
charge me. Even though it was a misdemeanor. I paid my
fines, I went to probation. One day, when I went to probation, there was a detainer out for me. A warrant, pretty
much. And that’s when the probation officer said, “We have a
federal warrant for you.” When I heard “Federal warrant,” I
said, “Why is the FBI trying to go after me? I haven’t done
anything.” And she told me, “No, it’s Immigration.” That’s
when they took me in. They considered it to be two crimes
of moral turpitude, equaling one aggravated felony. . . .
Then I stood it until a year after, which was July 3rd. And
then . . . the Immigration judge, he gave me the case, then it
went to appeals court, because the attorney general, she
appealed his ruling. . . I was called back later to go to court,
and then he [the judge] ordered me deported. He told me,
“Look, this is not what I want to do.” He knew what my
intentions were in the beginning. “And this is something that
has come from up above. And I just have to follow through.”
And that’s when he ordered me deported. On June 6,
2006. . . . When you got the deportation letter, “You’re inadmissible to the United States at any time.” It’s not for five
years, it’s not for three years. . . .
And we landed here at the airport, and I was like, “Wow, this
is nice. . . .” And you start to get homesick. I miss where I
grew up. “Where’s this? Where’s that?” But little by little, you
get used to it. You don’t adapt, but you get used to it. . .. I
guess I have no plans. Just to get married. This is just part
of my sentence. I’m just going it day by day. Just a little bit
more freedom. I guess I haven’t settled in yet, it hasn’t kicked
in. That I’m destined to be here for the rest of my life. I
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guess it hasn’t set in that this is a life sentence. I just don’t
want to accept it.

Despite the very different situations of these two interviewees
—one was a former prisoner in California and another was a
deportee in San Salvador—there are striking similarities between
their narratives. Both describe bewilderment about the rationale
behind the highly punitive conditions they experienced. Max did
not know why he was isolated, and Amilcar could not understand
how a DUI and simple drug possession—charges to which he
had pled guilty—added up to an aggravated felony for immigration purposes. Confinement frustrated their attempts to fight
these sanctions: Max could only avail himself of a classification
hearing every 120 days, and Amilcar was eventually worn down
by being detained throughout the appeal process. Each of them
describes a moment of “crossing” from one reality to another.
Max speaks of the long bus ride, during which he tried to memorize details of the landscape to which he would no longer have
access; Amilcar describes the plane flight that landed him in El
Salvador, where he initially was impressed with his surroundings,
but then was confused and disoriented. Each also describes being
subjected to what they called a “life sentence”—solitary confinement or removal—despite the fact that neither of these were an official
criminal sentence. In fact, the devastating and life-altering conditions that Max and Amilcar experienced were imposed administratively, by either a prison official or an immigration judge,
without the due process protections available to defendants in a
criminal court. Furthermore, each of these “sentences” was for an
indeterminate period of time, adding to Max’s and Amilcar’s
emotional distress and perceptions of unfairness.
Our interviews with prisoners and deportees such as Max
and Amilcar enable us to analyze how individuals are constituted
within legal categories (Coutin 2000; Foucault 1977; Merry 1990;
Yngvesson 1993) by examining the legal subjects created by
expanded uses of isolation and deportation. Subjects, like Max
and Amilcar, dispossessed of even the spaces of deprivation, like
prison or living without documentation in the United States, usually occupied by marginalized groups, experience a form of social
disintegration: ties to others are cut off and prior identities
stripped away, often with devastating consequences for individuals’ senses of self. Disintegration is spatialized through removal—
in the case of prisoners, being confined in a tiny solitary cell, and
in the case of immigrants, being expelled beyond U.S. borders.
In spite of this bleak process, disintegrated subjects demonstrate
a resilience that sometimes allows them to re-cross the borders
constraining their humanity.
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Examining disintegrated subjects bridges carceral and immigration contexts, bringing criminological literature on increased
punitiveness into conversation with immigration scholarship on
the securitization of immigration policy (Gottschalk 2015; Stumpf
2006), and highlights the individual experiences underlying these
larger institutional processes. Scholars of prisons and immigration
have called for more work on the subjective experience of both
incarceration (Rhodes 2001; Wacquant 2002) and deportation
(DeGenova et al. 2014). Indeed, understanding legal processes
requires a close examination of lived experience within legal contexts (Auyero 2012; Calavita and Jenness 2014; Engel and
Munger 2003; Ewick and Silbey 1998). We focus on individual
subjects in two punitive, administrative contexts. In doing so, we
build on a growing body of scholarship examining experiences
both of incarceration and deportation in the United States and
throughout the Western world (e.g., Calavita and Jenness 2014;
Coutin 2010; Dreby 2013; Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2014; Hasselberg 2016; Reiter 2014; Schinkel 2014; Sexton 2015).
In exploring disintegrated subjects, we also contribute to
scholarship that adapts Foucauldian analyses of subjectification to
current social realities. In the 1970s, Foucault theorized that
modern carceral tactics seek to habituate and discipline penal
subjects into allegedly unresisting, obedient citizens (1977). To
explain increases in both rates of incarceration and deportation,
scholars have extended Foucault’s arguments, examining how the
state sorts subjects into categories of risk (Dowling and Inda
2013; Feeley and Simon 1992; Garland 1987; Kanstroom 2007).
But the idea of this disciplinary subject, controlled through risk
management strategies, fails to fully capture the lived experience
of our interviewees. Indeed, as Hasselberg argued in a recent
book on deportation in the United Kingdom, the undocumented
experienced the threat of removal not as disciplining them into
being productive citizens, but rather as both punitive and as a
means of “coerc[ing] them to leave” (2016: 94). By attending to
the voices of subjects experiencing key forms of exclusion in the
United States, we elucidate the forms of subjectification and
exclusion occurring through modern governmental policies.
We argue that administrative sanctions with punitive effects
are linked to a broader shift in state-subject relations, shifts in
which the state’s claims to “know” its subjects (claims that are not
always subject to legal evaluation) authorize its use of discretion
against those deemed threatening. In this process, states not only
produce so-called “felons” and “illegals,” sorting these groups
into risk categories, but also create sub-categories of total excludability, like the “worst of the worst” and “the deportable.”
Through
surveillance,
everyone,
including
both
the
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nonincarcerated and citizens, becomes a potentially excludable
subject, compelled to distinguish themselves from “criminals” and
“illegals.” And of course, these categories have been racialized.
For instance, immigration officials might question anyone who
appears “foreign” (often assessed based on racial appearance or
stereotypes), and police officers might question anyone who
appears to be a gang member (again often assessed based on
racial appearance or stereotypes). To avoid being questioned,
individuals try to “perform” citizenship and law-abidingness
through their dress style and mode of comportment (Garcia
2014; Menjıvar 2016). Isolation and deportation, therefore, compel individuals throughout society to inhabit and resist the categorizations that justify imposing harsh penalties. This process
upends the Foucauldian disciplining effect, assigning some subjects to a status of “un-disciplinable.”

The Rise of Administrative Sanctions: Producing Excludable
Subjects
There is an eerie synchronicity in the expansion of the scope and
scale of long-term solitary confinement and noncitizen deportations
throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the United States. In 1986, Arizona
opened the first modern supermax facility (Lynch 2010): a technologically advanced structure, where the fluorescent lights stayed on permanently, with self-contained, modular, windowless cells, designed to keep
prisoners locked in a cement box, with no human contact, for at least
23 hours per day, for months, and often years at a time. Prison administrators, not judges, assigned the first prisoners to these harsh conditions, based on in-prison behavior and classification rules. Also in 1986,
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
IRCA increased border patrol funding, contributing to the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border, and facilitating deportations. The law
also imposed the first sanctions on employers who hired undocumented immigrants (Bean et al. 1990). Though easily flouted (Calavita
1990), IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions were a key step in diffusing the enforcement of U.S. immigration law throughout society; key
“gatekeepers”—for example, employers, welfare officers, school admissions officials, airlines, banks—now indirectly enforce immigration law,
by denying services to individuals who lack appropriate identity documents (Coutin 1993; Lynch 2015), much as prison administrators indirectly punish prisoners via assignment to supermaxes.
The Arizona supermax and IRCA’s employer sanctions were templates for further expansions in the use of solitary confinement and
the exclusion of noncitizens. The Arizona supermax became the prototype for supermaxes across the United States; California copied the
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Arizona model just three years later, building Pelican Bay State
Prison, equipped with 1,056 isolation beds (Reiter 2012). Over the
next decade, nearly every state built a supermax facility (Riveland
1999). The same year that the federal government opened a supermax, California voters passed Proposition 187: Save Our State (SOS).
Though eventually declared unconstitutional, Proposition 187 sought
to require public officials to verify individuals’ immigration status,
and thus to preclude undocumented immigrants from accessing public services. Like the supermaxes in California and Colorado, Proposition 187 extended the harsh restrictions first codified in IRCA.2
Parallel punitive innovations directed at prisoners and immigrants expanded throughout the 1990s. In 1996, Congress passed
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). PLRA
restricted litigation initiated by prisoners (Schlanger 2003). IIRIRA
expanded the class of criminal convictions that resulted in immigration consequences, eliminated waivers to challenge removal
proceedings, allocated additional enforcement funding, and dramatically restricted already scarce opportunities for legalization for
the undocumented.3 AEDPA exaggerated the effects of both pieces
of legislation, implementing newly strict deadlines and rigid limitations on when prisoners may file habeas petitions seeking judicial
review of the constitutionality of their imprisonment (or execution)
and limiting the procedural rights of immigrants facing deportation, including mandating pre-removal detention.
These exclusionary measures had swift and dramatic effects.
Levels of deportation increased exponentially: nearly 18 times as
many people were deported from the United States in 2013
(438,421) as in 1986 (24,592) (Department of Homeland Security
2004, 2015, Table 39; Gonzales-Barrera and Krogstad 2014). Data
on rates of solitary confinement use are less systematically collected
(and vary by state) (Naday et al. 2008), but in the federal prison system alone, between 2008 and 2013, the number of prisoners in solitary confinement increased 17 percent, while the prison
2
Scholars have noted that, while the imprisonment and deportation trends are clearly
national in scope, many of the innovations began at the local level (Campbell 2011; Gilmore
2007; Lynch 2010; Schoenfeld 2010). Just as the first supermax started in one state (Arizona), some of the earliest immigration policies grew out of state initiatives (like California’s
Proposition 187).
3
IIRIRA broadened the definition of “aggravated felonies,” expanding a criminal
category originally created with the 1998 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, during the war on drugs
ramp up. The category initially included murder, federal drug trafficking, and some firearms trafficking, but Congress has expanded the category a number of times in the past
three decades (Lynch 2016). The term “aggravated felony” now includes more than thirty
relatively minor and non-violent crimes, including filing a false tax return and failing to
appear in court (American Immigration Council 2016).
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population increased only six percent (Maurer 2013). Over the last
30 years, when solitary confinement use has been tracked, increases
in the rates of use across the United States have paralleled—and
often surpassed—steep increases in rates of incarceration. The U.S.
prison population more than tripled from just over 500,000 in
1986 to almost 1.6 million in 2013 (Carson 2014). Neither the
domestic punishment nor the immigrant deportation literature has
established any significant relationships between targeted behavior
and the increase in sanctions (American Immigration Council
2013: Figure 8; Zimring 2007). Both deportation and solitary confinement represent key aspects of over-criminalization and provide
a critical lens for examining the harshest impacts of the broader
trend (Reiter 2016a).

The Emergence of a Disintegrated Subject
The processes of categorizing and excluding some gang members, noncitizens, and others who are deemed security threats create a
new kind of post-Foucauldian disintegrated subject. Foucault contrasted
juridical and disciplinary subjects with sovereign subjects as follows:
We have, then, the sovereign and his force, the social body
and the administrative apparatus; mark, sign, trace; ceremony,
representation, exercise; the vanquished enemy, the juridical
subject in the process of requalification, the individual subjected to immediate coercion; the tortured body, the soul with
its manipulated representations, the body subjected to training.
(Foucault 1977: 130–31)

As this quote suggests, the juridical subject is party to a social contract between the state and its legal subjects. If a citizen violates the
law, the state then has the power to punish according to the terms of
the law. A completed punishment restores the individual to full citizenship status. By contrast, the disciplinary subject is controlled by an
administrative apparatus, which inculcates or discourages certain tendencies. The apparatus punishes to produce obedient subjects. The
state calibrates training according to individual conditions, seeking to
instill habits that lead individuals to govern themselves (Rhodes
2004). Punishment is complete when subjects have internalized social
norms and become capable of self-governing.
Our interviewees, however, are not coerced into becoming disciplined subjects. Instead, they are sorted into excludable categories,
stripped of rights, and ultimately removed from existing social and
governmental structures. Though deportees and the solitarily confined experience exclusionary sanctions as punitive, neither sanction
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Table 1. Introducing the Disintegrated Subject
Juridical
Subject

Disciplinary
Subject

1. State-subject
relationship

Party to social
contract

Individual governed
by habits

2. State’s process

Social body
punishes
Punishment is sign

Administrative
apparatus punishes
Punishment is trace

Representation

Exercise

In process of
requalification
Appeal to universal
norms, law
Power to punish

Individual subject
to coercion
Classify, rank,
discipline
Power to observe,
correct

3. How punishment
operates
4. Subject’s experience
5. Mode of change
6. Form of justification
7. Authorization

Disintegrated Subject
Member of excludable
(or potentially
excludable) category
Administrative
apparatus ensnares
Punishment is absent
Exclusion and
racialization
Disintegration
Categorize, exercise
discretion, exclude
Power to exclude

Note: The characteristics of the juridical and disciplinary subject derive from Foucault
(1977).

is part of the repertoire of punishments available to courts. Rather,
administrators impose the sanctions discretionarily, unlimited by the
due process rules or civil rights that are supposed to protect defendants in criminal cases. By legal construction, punishment is absent.
The solitarily confined and the deported are excluded even from
the environment where other prisoners are “warehoused” (Feeley
and Simon 1992), or from the “shadows” where immigrants who
live in the United States without documentation reside. They
become disintegrated subjects.
Building on the contrasts that Foucault draws between juridical and disciplinary subjects as ideal types, Table 1 offers a preliminary definition of this disintegrated subject.4
The concept of the disintegrated subject contributes to literature that has attempted to explain rising over-criminalization.
Explanations have focused on risk management strategies (Ashworth and Zedner 2014; Feeley and Simon 1992; Dowling and
Inda 2013; Irwin 2005; Motomura 2006: 14); structural conditions (DeGenova 2002; Gilmore 2007); the legal infrastructure,
including a “shadow carceral state” that manages populations
deemed dangerous (Beckett and Murakawa 2012); and racialization (Chavez 2008; Goodman 2008; Johnson 1996; Perea 1997,
Sanchez 1997; Wacquant 2002). Our analysis builds on this work
by examining those who are not merely warehoused (Feeley and
Simon 1992; Irwin 2005), or treated as suspect (Ashworth and
Zedner 2014; Motomura 2006), but who are excluded even from
prisons (by being placed in isolation), or even from life as an
4
Although our interviewees were often permanently excluded, they experienced the
process of disintegration as ongoing and incomplete.
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undocumented immigrant (through deportation). By focusing on
these disintegrated subjects, we are able to theorize the subjectification process that individuals undergo as they are transformed.
Both racialization and rights stripping are critical to understanding this transformation. Although the categories “white” and
“non-white” are unstable and “based on the material and economic interests of the labeling audience” (Calavita 2010: 57),
assignment to these categories becomes a pathway to exclusion
and eventually disintegration. For instance, in the immigration
context, the Supreme Court has held that Mexican appearance is
a “relevant factor” in traffic stops (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
[1975]). And in the criminal context, gang labeling has disproportionate effects on African Americans and Latinos (Mu~
niz 2015;
Reiter 2012). These labeling processes tend to happen within civil
or administrative frameworks (Coutin 2005; Reiter and Koenig
2015), through the exercise of “legally hybrid control tools”
blending civil and criminal legal authority over marginal populations, augmenting state power while simultaneously limiting procedural protections and minimizing burdens of proof (Beckett
and Evans 2015: 242; see also Chac
on 2012; Harris 2007; Eagly
2010). Our contribution to this work is to demonstrate that racial
labeling and denial of legal protections sets certain individuals
apart, even within broader categories of marginalization—prisoners, the undocumented—thus resulting in the undoing of persons
and of social relationships, a process that subjects resist.

Methods and Data
Our analysis is based on two data sources: (1) interviews that
one author conducted in California and New York between 2010
and 2013 with 19 former prisoners who had spent one month or
more in solitary confinement during their incarceration and (2)
interviews that the other author conducted in 2008 with 41 Salvadoran men who grew up in the United States and were deported
to El Salvador. Of the 19 former prisoners, 18 were men. They
were roughly one-third white, one-third African American, and
one-third Latino. They ranged in age from 30 to 62; the average
age was 44. They had spent anywhere from one month to 10
years in solitary confinement—on average, just under 3 years—in
federal prisons (2) and in state prisons in New York (7) and California (8). The 41 Salvadoran men ranged in age from 22 to 69;
the average age was 33. Their average age at the time that they
originally immigrated to the United States was 10.6 years old,
and they had lived an average of 16.2 years outside of El Salvador prior to deportation. Subjects had spent an average of 5
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years living in El Salvador since their most recent deportation.
Some had been deported only months prior to the interview;
others had lived in El Salvador for years following their most
recent deportation; and many had been deported multiple times.
Ninety percent had entered the United States without authorization, whereas 10 percent entered legally, either with a tourist visa
or with a green card. The majority of the sample nonetheless
had obtained some form of temporary or potentially permanent
resident rights in the United States.
To reach deportees, Susan collaborated with Salvadoran nongovernmental organizations that work on immigrant rights and
on gang violence prevention. To identify those formerly in solitary confinement, Keramet collaborated with re-entry organizations and prison education programs. For both projects,
interviews were semi-structured, lasted one to four hours, and
were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded for themes. We conducted these two projects separately, and are now bringing them
together for the purposes of this analysis. Doing so allows us to
look both at individual experiences of legal exclusion and at the
larger logics that shape both systems simultaneously.
Disintegration

Both isolation and deportation create categories of exclusion:
the “worst of the worst,” or those who are “prioritized” for
deportation. Excluded individuals experience disintegration in
two senses: (1) they are set apart from others and (2) they
describe feeling as if they are falling apart, or dissolving. Disintegration contrasts starkly with the ideal held out for both prisoners and immigrants; the former are expected to reintegrate into
society following incarceration, and the latter are expected to integrate through becoming acclimated to and forming close ties
within the United States. Both the prisoner reentry and immigrant integration literatures have defined integration as developing multiple and thick linkages—such as stable employment, civic
engagement, educational achievements, family relationships, language skills, volunteer activities, religious involvement, and
assets—resulting in productive and pro-social behaviors and relationships (Ashar et al. 2015; Givens 2007; Mauer and ChesneyLind 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou 1997). Drawing on
this literature, we define disintegration as the breaking off of
such linkages. The resulting disconnections are the opposite of
disciplining, in the Foucauldian sense.
For our interviewees, disintegration occurs through several
steps. The process begins with ensnarement: administrators attribute a negative characteristic to an individual, and then magnify

578

Crossing Borders and Criminalizing Identity

this characteristic so much that it erases other aspects of personhood. “Ensnarement” conveys the way that interviewees found
themselves trapped in a web of policies that wrapped ever tighter
as they moved. As they are ensnared, individuals are racialized
and stripped of rights through administrative proceedings, which
appear arbitrary, extralegal, and unbounded. For our interviewees, administrative proceedings result in an exclusionary action—
isolation or removal— which seemingly irrevocably takes subjects
out of the activities, social network, and physical environment to
which they are accustomed. As with negative labeling, the effects
of exclusionary action can magnify over time, as individuals suffer depression, physical deprivation, and material impoverishment. Yet disintegration is usually incomplete, as subjects attempt
to reconstruct the self, forging or rebuilding ties, creating new,
albeit limited activities, and in some cases, re-crossing borders
that separate them from society. Disintegration nonetheless leaves
scars, psychologically, socially, physically, and legally. We describe
each of these processes in turn, elucidating how the shared experiences of our interviewees illustrate the disintegrated subject
being produced by hybrid civil-criminal sanctions.
Ensnarement

For our subjects, ensnarement in administrative categories
began when U.S. authorities targeted individuals for isolation or
removal and continued through the process authorizing the
exclusionary outcome. Though we emphasize the parallels in
prisoners’ and deportees’ experiences, the procedures that each
group undergoes are somewhat different.
Prison officials assign prisoners to long-term isolation, either
for violating specific in-prison rules (such isolation terms are usually fixed from a few months to a few years), or for being a gang
member, or other category of prisoner too dangerous to house in
the general prison population (such isolation terms are usually
indefinite).5 Although policies vary widely, every state has some
form of long-term isolation. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that prior to placement in long-term isolation, a prisoner must
receive a statement of the reasons for placement, have some
opportunity to respond to this statement, and have some means
for seeking review of the placement decision (Wilkinson v. Austin
2005). Prisoners facing long-term isolation, however, have no
5
Prisoners might also be placed in solitary confinement for “protective custody,”
because of a risk of being assaulted in the general prison population. However, this process
is different from the administrative hearings described above and not the subject of the
interviews conducted here.
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right to a lawyer, to call witnesses, or to present evidence in their
defense. In California, for instance, until 2015, most prisoners in
long-term isolation had been “validated” as gang members and
assigned to indeterminate terms.6 In many cases, the evidence
underlying the validation was confidential, and prisoners were
not permitted to see it. Although each validated gang member
had a right to a review hearing every six months, presenting any
kind of rebuttal without access to either the underlying validation
evidence or a trained advocate was nearly impossible.
As well, in the case of immigration, noncitizens can become
targets for removal in several ways. Some are apprehended crossing the U.S.-Mexico border or at a port of entry. Others are
detained in the interior: in a workplace raid; when questioned by
immigration authorities; or increasingly, by police, at a checkpoint or other location. And still others are identified when they
enter the criminal justice system. Increasingly, prison and police
authorities collaborate with immigration officials through agreements that authorize the police to enforce immigration laws. A
recently reinstated program known as Secure Communities, a
federal information sharing system, enabled Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to place a hold on arrested or incarcerated noncitizens in local and state facilities.
Because IIRIRA and AEDPA expanded the range of criminal
convictions with immigration consequences, even lawful permanent residents can be subject to removal. Once they have completed any prison or jail time to which they have been sentenced,
potential deportees are transferred to ICE custody—held at a
detention facility while their removal hearing takes place. In
many cases, detention is mandatory, so detainees are not eligible
to be released on bond. At removal hearings, which often take
place in a detention facility or by videoconference rather than in
court, respondents have the right to an attorney at their own
expense—a challenge for many, since they are in detention and
cannot work. Individuals who are ordered removed may appeal,
but often must remain in custody throughout the appeal process.
Often, the only way for individuals to extricate themselves from
detention is to stop fighting their cases and agree to removal.
Noncitizens who fail to attend an immigration hearing can be
ordered deported in absentia; once they come to ICE’s attention,
the removal order can be executed without any further hearing.
6
The validation process required documentation of three “independent source
items,” which might include tattoos, notes (in prison lingo “kites”) passed between alleged
gang members, or even reading material associated with certain gangs. These gang validation policies were revised pursuant to a settlement reached in September of 2015 in the case
of Ashker v. Brown.
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Such individuals are only in detention briefly, while removal
arrangements are made.
While the procedures differ across our two cases, for both
prisoners and noncitizens, ensnarement begins with a triggering
moment, in which individuals are identified as “the worst of the
worst,” “illegal,” or a “criminal alien.” Herbert, for instance, had
been ordered deported in absentia after failing to attend a court
hearing in 1998. Years later, he was stopped and arrested for outstanding traffic tickets, for which he was assigned to do hours of
social work. But the arrest brought him to the attention of immigration officials. He related, “They told me, ‘Wait, you’re going
directly.’” There was no additional hearing. Such triggering
moments initiate a process in which the subject loses control and
is unable to effectively challenge officials’ claims about illegality.
Similarly, Max, the prisoner quoted at the outset of our
paper, was identified and placed in the SHU abruptly, based on
evidence that he said was fabricated, but which he had little
opportunity to challenge:
They had sent me up there saying that I was a gang member,
that I was a shot caller, that I was involved in violence . . .
There was never any documented proof . . . You know when
you receive a disciplinary report, you get a 115 [“Rules Violation Report” paperwork] saying that you were apprehended
doing this or the other—never had one of those.

Wilbur, who had political asylum before being deported to El
Salvador, described a similarly abrupt experience, in which he
felt helpless to resist the label assigned to him: “I had a felony
conviction, for drugs. And from that moment, when I entered
prison, they took away all of my papers. Immediately they took
away the political asylum.”
After this triggering moment, officials subject prisoners or
noncitizens to a hearing that satisfies minimal legal requirements
for procedural justice, but that interviewees experienced as
unfair, punitive, and in violation of legal norms. For instance,
Norberto was struck by the disproportionate severity of being
deported to El Salvador after being convicted of three DUIs,
which seemed to him to be relatively minor infractions. Victor,
another deportee, felt that the removal process violated his constitutional rights:
The first violation of my constitutional rights is that they didn’t
give me bail. The only crime for which one can’t get bail is
murder. Second, I had done my time for the crime, and now
they wanted to deport me. That is double jeopardy. A violation
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of the constitution. And then, you are left without an attorney
if you can’t afford it. That’s not constitutional. And then, they
take you out of the state where you are! They took me from
California to Texas. Different circuits. 9th circuit and 5th circuit.
And how am I going to get an attorney there, if the telephone
doesn’t work? The attorney says, “Call me at 1-800.” But the
phones don’t take 1-800 calls. Only calling cards. And if you
have no money, you can’t get a calling card. You’re beaten!

Such procedures led interviewees to conclude that the legal
system was arbitrary and irrational. Ernie, a former prisoner,
described how he was validated as a gang member based on
weak evidence: “I was validated on confidential informants, just
hearsay, what people say. I don’t claim to be an angel, but trust
me, this validation thing, they’re really onto something because
they can lock anybody up.” Ernie spoke fondly of an earlier time,
before California’s main supermax at Pelican Bay (the SHU)
existed, when “they didn’t put you in the SHU [Security Housing
Unit] for 20 years because you had my magazine or you had my
book.” By contrast, after Ernie had served five years of an indeterminate isolation term, officers searched his cell, found the
book Matching wits with Menza, and renewed his gang validation
for another six years, simply because the book had the name of
an alleged gang member scribbled inside the cover. Even though
California was reforming such policies, Ernie expressed cynicism
about the possibility for change: “I wouldn’t count on it,” he said.
Regarding the surprising lack of legal protections, he commented: “It’s hard to understand how they can get away with
what they do. And you have no defense. You don’t get a lawyer
to represent you and discredit what’s being said about you.”
Both deportees and isolated prisoners, then, expressed frustration with processes that seemed to them to lack substantive
fairness—echoing legal scholars’ arguments that these increasingly harsh sanctions prioritize constitutional proceduralism over
substantive fairness (Stuntz 2006, 2011). But even constitutional
proceduralism seemed lacking to our interviewees. Many noted
they had not committed murder or controlled gangs, but were
detained anyway. They thus implicitly criticized their experiences
of “preventive justice” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014). The isolated
and deported individuals we interviewed described feeling as if
they lacked legal protections—and most definitely were not part
of the social contract—from the first moment of being labeled as
isolatable or deportable (Beckett and Evans 2015; Chac
on 2012;
Eagly 2010; Reiter and Koenig 2015).
Interviewees experienced exclusion as fundamentally dehumanizing, consistent with what scholars have identified as a shift
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away from individualized, rehabilitation-oriented treatment
towards group-oriented risk management (e.g., Feeley and Simon
1992). Marcus, a deportee who had two minor criminal convictions but was attempting to turn his life around, complained that
the decision to deport him was not based on a true assessment of
his character: “It’s really sad because they do not have the time
to look into your history and to say, ‘Okay, you are a real criminal
and you should go back.’” Interviewees like Marcus were particularly struck by what they characterized as officials’ callousness
about the inhumane outcomes of their administrative rulings.
When Marcus, who was in removal proceedings, told an official
that he was married to a U.S. citizen, the official allegedly
responded: “We don’t care. That’s not the way we work.” Likewise Francisco, a deportee, recalled that when he was in immigration court, he observed another man’s case: “He said [to the
immigration judge], ‘I have all my family here, I have my kids
here.’ The judge said, ‘I don’t care. Take them with you.’ And
then he was like, ‘How am I gonna feed them?’ He was like,
‘That’s your problem. Take them with you. You’re going back.’”
Importantly, these experiences reveal a sorting not just into risk
categories, but into excludable risk categories.
Interviewees described how officials’ dismissal of their basic
human concerns often blurred into abuse—echoing scholars’
criticisms about the lack of adherence to legal procedures within
state exercises of discretionary authority (Ashworth and Zedner
2014; Reiter and Koenig 2015). Interviewees remarked on the
double standard that guards could insult or beat them with impunity, while they themselves faced highly punitive consequences
for even minor infractions. Brandon, who was sent to isolation
for a disciplinary violation, pointed out that a guard who had
confiscated his personal property was not punished, whereas he
was placed in solitary for allegedly assaulting this officer. Prisoners further described how callousness extended into their day-today lives in isolation. For instance, Ray remembered being
escorted to the lieutenant’s office a few years into his indeterminate stay in solitary. He was scared—“because they don’t pull you
out of your cell for nothing, unless they have to.” In the lieutenant’s office, his hands and feet still shackled, he was told to call
home—his first phone call in years. His family answered and told
him his brother had been killed. Then he was escorted, alone,
back to his cell, where he remembered weeping uncontrollably.
And Mary, the one female formerly isolated prisoner interviewed,
remembered “all the time, just constant insults. Very—I want to
say aggressive in that way—aggressively insulting. Not just superreactive or something, but really aggressive. I just hated them so
much. It kinda kept me going, because I just hated them.” The
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combination of being sorted out while experiencing callous abuse
amplified interviewees’ experiences of ensnarement.
Racialization

The exclusionary process is explicitly racialized. First, African
Americans and Latinos are disproportionately stripped of the
rights otherwise afforded to legal persons (Johnson 1996; Reiter
2012). Second, the “worst of the worst,” the “criminal alien,” or
“terrorists” usually represent stereotyped caricatures of dangerousness (Martinez and Lee 2000; Reiter 2014: 581). Existing
social hierarchies, especially racially oppressive ones, reinforce
the creation of these categories of excludable subjects. For
instance, prison policies, especially long-term solitary confinement, seek to control the threat of allegedly dangerous AfricanAmerican and Latino gang leaders (Reiter 2014), while deportation seeks to control the alleged “Latino threat” (Chavez 2008;
Johnson 1996; Perea 1997; Sanchez 1997).
Consistent with the literature on racialization, interviewees
highlighted race as an omnipresent factor reinforcing their
excludability. For example, Barry, who had been in solitary confinement in California prisons in the late 1980s and early 1990s
complained: “[W]hen I hit the prison, no matter what happened,
they didn’t—I wasn’t individual anymore, I was a number . . .
And I wasn’t just a CDC [California Department of Corrections]
number, I was black, so I was counted with the black population.
Everything, like I said, was cut up into race.” Race was a determinative factor in Derrick’s categorization as an isolatable gang
member. Although he was ethnically Polynesian, he was racially
ambiguous to the prison system. He identified with an AfricanAmerican gang, the Bloods, but he often got confused for a Mexican. He ended up in solitary confinement, mistakenly, because of
these very racial categories:
When the riot happened between the Mexicans and black
Mexicans attacked all of the black inmates. And some of them
. . . were friends and so when it came, we all fought. And the
problem was when I went to the Hole [solitary confinement],
the way I looked, even though . . . my cellie was black, and he
was a Blood, they thought I was a Mexican and all of the
Mexicans . . . had gotten SHU [solitary confinement] terms . . .
[but] all the blacks got suspended SHU, but they gave me a
SHU for forcing violence, and I’m like, “What’s going on?”

Because of his dark skin color, Derrick was mistaken for a
Mexican, blamed for being part of the group that started a riot,
and sent to solitary confinement at Pelican Bay. It took him three
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months to file the paperwork to convince prison administrators
of the mistake.
Such race-based categorizations not only get prisoners into
trouble, but also create double binds. For instance, Ernie
described how, as a white guy in the Pelican Bay SHU, he saw
few other white guys and often felt lonesome, especially because
prison culture discourages communication across racial categories
(Goodman 2008). But Ernie could not request a transfer to a pod
of cells with a different racial composition: “I can’t stand there at
the door and argue with the cop—‘hey I’m the only white guy
here’—and then you’re going to look racist.”
Deportees also described how racial categorizations exaggerated their excludability. Some deportees thought that, as Latinos
and immigrants, they were unfairly blamed for the events of 9/11.
Victor argued: “This president, when he started removing all of the
Latinos, although it wasn’t just him, it was the government. That is
pure discrimination. Racism. They don’t want the Latinos to get
ahead. Even though it was not the Latinos who caused this problem.
The terrorists didn’t cross the Mexican border. They crossed the
Canadian border. Second, they are from the other side of the world.
And we have to pay the price.” Other deportees, like Manuel, complained about being subjected to racial abuse by prison guards, who
shouted: “Spics! Fucking, Spics! Get out of here!”
For interviewees, the stripping away of legal rights—no attorneys, no rights to appeal, no ability to present rebuttal evidence—blurred with the stripping of their individuality and
identity as Americans, non gang-members, anything other than a
“criminal” or an “illegal.” Deris, who had been deported,
described how, when he was trying to fight deportation, he felt
both rights-less and alone: “Imagine, you’re in a place where no
one—if I had had a family member to say, ‘Look, this is happening,’ and to get an attorney to fight my case. . .. I told them, ‘I
want to talk to a judge.’ They said, ‘You don’t have rights.’”
Ensnarement, together with racialization, initiates the process
of disintegration. Both are integral to the creation of excludable
subjects. During ensnarement, enforcement attention focuses on a
single criminal issue or immigration violation—or worse, on a
superficial characteristic like race, or a generic status like gang
member or noncitizen—to the exclusion of other aspects of individuals’ biographies. A gang affiliation results in an indeterminate
term in isolation. Three DUIs can result in deportation. Although
prisoners and deportees experienced ensnarement as arbitrary,
lacking in fundamental procedural protections, and excessively
punitive, prison officials and judges treated offenses and statuses
as objectively assigned, allowing little room for discretion. Our
interviewees experienced not a disciplining, but an undisciplining:
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a stripping away of the rights and characteristics of citizenship in
preparation for exclusion.
Exclusion

The process of disintegration continues from ensnarement to
removal from the United States or placement in isolation within a
prison. Rather than being a single action, removal and isolation
are ongoing processes, beginning before an individual actually
experiences exclusion and continuing long afterwards (Drotbohm
and Hasselberg 2014). Both removal and isolation cut individuals
off from their previous social networks, including networks
formed in detention facilities or prison. Deportees are able to
rejoin relatives in their country of origin, but they are often cutoff from children, siblings, parents, spouses, and partners in the
United States. Isolated prisoners are unable to see family members or experience a human touch. The totality of this exclusion
ultimately placed interviewees outside of society, where they
experienced a disintegration of social ties, existential purpose,
and sense of self.
Interviewees described the loss occasioned by exclusion in
vivid, multi-faceted terms. Victor, a deportee, spoke sadly of his
longing to be with his son in the United States: “And my 12-yearold son, the youngest . . . But he is my baby, el chiquito, and I love
him.” Individuals who are deported or placed in isolation are
unable to avail themselves of simple human needs, such as holding their children, or visiting their parents on their deathbeds.
Derrick, who was in isolation, related: “I lost my Mom when I
was in here, and I was fortunate, I had got a call from my
brother who called the counselor, and the counselor had the
guard come escort me down to the office and they informed me
that she had passed away. There was nothing I could do.” In the
prior section, Ray described learning of his brother’s death, and
being left to weep in his cell; Derrick, by contrast, appreciated
that he learned of his mother’s death from a counselor. But he
experienced a similar sense of helplessness and isolation, unable
to be with his family.
This lack of social connections and the rejection associated
with isolation or removal has devastating emotional and mental
health consequences, akin to civil death (Agamben 1998, 2013).
For deportees, civil death can be experienced as exile from the
country to which they immigrated and social exclusion in the
country to which they are deported. For those in solitary, civil
death can be experienced as exile not only from society but from
the prison community, too. In contrast to Agamben’s notion of
“bare life,” however, exclusion is not a state of exception that
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suspends the law in order to uphold the law. Rather, it results
from discretion, a form of state power that resists legal constraints.7 Norberto, who was deported, described the emotional
impact of deportation, “I came emotionally broken. I had no
desire to keep living.” Edgar, another deportee, commented, “I
felt alone, abandoned, destroyed.” Likewise, Kevin, a prisoner
who had been in solitary confinement, described the mental
health challenges provoked by the removal of social stimulation
in isolation:
I’ve seen smart, articulate, intelligent, very extremely intelligent people lose their minds in solitary confinement. It’s a
scary thing to be left alone with only your thoughts. For 23
hours a day . . . A lot of inmates take psych meds in order to
cope with it, and for me that was always a sign of weakness,
psychotropics, and I would see what they would do to people
that were on them for extended amounts of time. It was
scary. I think that was scarier than just me being locked
inside a box for a year or two years or whatever.

Both isolation and deportation were ultimately counterproductive: removing individuals from families and jobs and producing serious mental health problems (see, e.g., Haney and Lynch
1997). Strategies designed to mitigate risk actually exacerbated it,
rendering prisoners less manageable as they experienced mental
deterioration and creating an underclass of immigrants considering returning, without authorization, to their U.S. families.
Furthermore, deportees and isolated prisoners described not
only experiencing depression and mental instability, but a more
fundamental deconstruction of the self into something less than
human, or worse, “nothing,” as one prisoner put it. Kevin, quoted
above, described being in solitary confinement in California: “I
equate it with being a caged animal, and then somebody poking
you with a stick.” Kevin’s statement highlights the dehumanization
that we described above. Brandon said that “[I]n the SHU program, I think you know what you’ve got coming. Nothing. You’re
close to nothing, so you don’t expect much.” Likewise, Edgar
described the dehumanizing process of being deported to El Salvador. He said that individuals return to “their” country in handcuffs,
without possessions, again echoing the idea of becoming nothing.
In a sense, those who are isolated or removed are not able to exist
anywhere. Victor, a deportee, described the impossibility of his
7
Of course, the state’s discretionary power can be challenged, as occurred in U.S. v.
Texas (579 U. S. __, 2016), in which 26 states sued to stop President Obama’s use of deferred
action to provide certain undocumented immigrants very limited immigration relief.
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circumstances, “I don’t have a country over there [in the United
States], I come over here [to El Salvador], I’m not even accepted,
right? And it was like, I was hating everything. I actually wanted to
kill myself. I thought suicide.”
Once isolated or deported, individuals are exposed to the violence and material harm about which officials expressed a lack of
concern during administrative proceedings. Violence, in turn,
exacerbates the subjects’ sense of being completely outside of
society. Victor, a deportee, described the challenges that he
encountered in El Salvador:
I got here with no money, nowhere to go. The United States
doesn’t care what happens. And to me, even prisoners get
$200 gate money [upon release]. And that’s in their own
home! But here, you’re going into a country, like in my situation, I didn’t even know where I’m going. And no, ‘Here
man, try to find yourself a place to sleep while you get a job.’
Then I get here and I ask around. ‘Well how old are you?’
’45.’ ‘You missed the train. The latest they hire here is 37 or
38 years old. You don’t have a job and you ain’t getting a
job. Unless you have family that own a company or a business.’ And I don’t have none of that. So basically, it’s like,
‘Here. Go survive.’

Victor’s comments indicate that disintegrating subjects are set
apart even from prisoners or the undocumented; in fact, he considered the treatment of prisoners, a deeply marginalized and
disadvantaged group, significantly better than the treatment of
deportees (see also Aliverti 2012). Cesar, a deportee, was terrified
that because of his tattoos, he would be targeted for gang violence in El Salvador. Deris, another deportee, actually had this
experience:
I went to where my mother lived [in El Salvador], and there
was someone there in Soyapango from a rival gang, when I
walked in. Poom! He asked me where I was from. I said I
wasn’t a gang member. “Take off your shirt!” “Why am
I going to take it off? I’ve just been deported, and that’s what
I was wearing.” “Take it off, you’re a gang member!” If a
police patrol hadn’t arrived just then, he would have killed me.

Likewise, many prisoners described their persistent fear that,
even in isolation, locked in their cells 23 hours per day, they
would be left alone in a hallway to fight with another prisoner.
Kevin described how prison guards in the 1980s and early 1990s
“would actually literally pit known gang members against each
other in the SHU yard, and then shoot ‘em down like dogs.” He

588

Crossing Borders and Criminalizing Identity

explained: “This is the kind of thing—this is the environment
that the public creates by proxy, not even that they’re aware of it,
because they give so much authority to these individuals, without
anybody overseeing them except for the wardens of the institutions, that they start to have god syndrome.” Other prisoners
described similar experiences with violence, even in isolation;
Derrick said he was constantly afraid that his cell door would
open at the same time as the cell door of some rival gang members, and he would be forced to fight:
You were always ready for that worse scenario to happen . . .
So you always have that in the back of your mind all the time
that that could happen coming out. Or that could happen
while you’re sitting there sleeping in your bed. Anytime—by
then anyway, you’ll just wake up anyway once you hear that
electric sliding. You’ll just kind of pop up anyway.
Keramet: Is it more anxiety there than on the mainline?
Because I mean in theory it could happen on the mainline
too, right? Someone could be after you.
Derrick: Yeah, but only if you do something. The SHU, you
don’t have to—you’re already dead.

As Derrick and others navigated these risks, they experienced
both a social death, cut off from community networks (Guenther
2013; Patterson 1985; Reiter and Koenig 2015), and also a sensation
of physical death, trapped in a space of nonexistence (Coutin 2005).
Some subjects described frustration not just with their own
experiences, but with the pervasive injustices enacted against
others. While Mary was serving a three-month term in isolation
for a disciplinary violation (organizing prisoners to express their
grievances about unsafe work conditions and inadequate provision of self-care products), she observed the arbitrary injustice of
allegedly placing prisoners in isolation for their own protection:
And there was a pregnant woman who was taken to SHU at
VSP [Valley State Prison], and they said it was because they
were concerned for her safety, but it wasn’t due to herself,
and she didn’t want to be there. They said they had no suitable room for her. . . . [I] also saw one person the second
time I was in SHU at VSP who was disabled and was put
into SHU, because they said they had no suitable place for
her.

For Deris, Derrick, Mary, and those Mary observed, isolation
and deportation were embodied processes—physically uncomfortable and existentially scary.
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Prisoners’ and deportees’ experiences of exclusion were magnified by their uncertainty about the duration of the exclusion.
As Andersson (2014) has noted, uncertainty is part of the biopolitics of power, which leaves individuals waiting to be sorted into
groups eligible (or ineligible) for social benefits. As detailed by
Javier Auyero in a study of the waiting room in an Argentine welfare office, being forced to wait an indefinite time for an uncertain outcome is a form of subordination experienced by the poor
(2012; see also Gustafson 2011). For Kevin, a prisoner quoted
above, one of the most difficult aspects of the SHU was its temporal indeterminacy:
You’re already out of your environment, which is scary
enough, knowing that you may not ever come out of that
box, or not knowing is even worse than knowing that you’re
gonna be doing—at least if you know that you have a certain
amount of time to do in the SHU, it’s something that you
can look forward to. If you’re never gonna get out of the
SHU, then at least it’s something that you can come to terms
with, within yourself. But the fact of not knowing is actually
something . . . It’s the worst thing ever.

Likewise, deportees wondered how long they would be subjected to removal and whether they would ever be able to return
to the United States. Recall Amilcar’s struggle to accept that
deportation might be a “life sentence.”
For interviewees, the severing of social ties, compromised
physical and mental well-being, and indeterminacy all compounded their sense of total exclusion. Nonetheless, interviewees
struggled to maintain a sense of self and to re-build their social
and political networks, resisting their categorical exclusions into
spaces of nonexistence.
Reconstituting the Self

Even though disintegration is emotionally and materially devastating, prisoners in solitary confinement and noncitizens who
have been removed reconstruct forms of sociality within spaces of
exclusion. In this sense, they are much like other prisoners, who
are surprisingly persistent in filing and pursuing grievances in
spite of their marginalized, stigmatized status (Calavita and Jenness 2014), or other undocumented immigrants, who find ways
of sharing identity documents (Horton 2015). Examining the
coping mechanisms used by deportees and those in isolation further elucidates both the disintegration that prisoners and deportees are resisting and the sociolegal mechanisms of categorization
and exclusion that produce the disintegration in the first place.
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The resources available to prisoners and deportees differ
dramatically. Prisoners in solitary confinement, by definition,
have very limited contact with others. Deportees, in contrast,
are at liberty to move about in their countries of origin, and are
therefore able to connect with family members still living there,
friends they knew from the past, and new acquaintances.
Deportees are also in a different country, literally removed from
the U.S. national context where, in many cases, they were
raised. Prisoners do not experience this transfer to a different
country, but in prison and particularly in isolation, they are in
something of another world. Still, there are striking similarities
in the strategies prisoners and deportees deploy to overcome
disintegration.
For both prisoners in solitary confinement and deportees in
El Salvador, reconstituting the self consists of building community, even with the limited resources available in exclusionary
spaces. Prisoners and deportees re-asserted their identities, and
thereby their existence, through developing creative forms of
sociality. For instance, Ernie, who described being the only
white guy in an isolation pod of eight cells for years, said that,
despite their racial differences, his pod coalesced into a community over time: “Everybody shares books, magazines. If you
don’t have money, people pitch in. We buy deodorant, toothpaste, and try to help one another.” Brandon also described
how prisoners shared books—when they could convince a
friendly guard to pass a book from cell to cell. And prisoners
cultivated talents that would be useful to other prisoners. Brandon explained:
My talent was sewing. I got me a sewing needle and thread,
and I learned how to sew.
Keramet: What did you sew?
Brandon: I was making a long sleeve T-shirt from shirts that got
cut off right here, and I’d sew another sleeve on, making it a long
sleeve. I was tapering, and altering, hemming pants and putting
permanent creases in them. I was making caps, gloves—
Keramet: And there’s a SHU uniform, right? Was there at the
time?
Brandon: The jumpsuit.
Keramet: And so you were tailoring the jumpsuit?
Brandon: Yeah, because these guys have a tendency to put
rubber bands on their cuff right here so their pants don’t be
slapping around while they’re on SHU. So what I’d do, I’d
just taper the pants off to make them smaller.
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Keramet: Would it be—did everybody want the same kind of
modifications?
Brandon: Yeah, usually cuffs, with the small cuffs. So you
know I charge them $1, $2. Give me your jumpsuits, and I
hook ‘em up for you, because remember, I got time on my
hands. So I started making dashiki’s and I was for real. And
the guy that showed me how to do it, he said, “Man, you sew
better than me. Damn, bro.”

Brandon explained how he made thread by pulling strands
from existing clothes, and sometimes he was permitted to have a
needle. Even in the extremely restrictive conditions of solitary
confinement, he taught himself new skills, and shared these skills
with other prisoners on his pod. Prisoners in isolation also
described the importance of writing letters to family members
and friends on the outside, who allowed them to feel connected
and imagine another world.
Likewise, for deportees, overcoming disintegration requires
creating new forms of sociality, whether through employment,
faith communities, family or friendship networks, recreating
aspects of their formers lives, or even returning to the United
States illicitly. Reynaldo found deportation devastating, until he
was able to find a job at a call center based in San Salvador. He
recounted, “I straightened out my life. I had my boss, who
supplied me with a lot of help. Had it not been for him, I’d
probably be six feet under.” Jorge, another deportee, got married after being deported. His wife helped him to change his
dress style so that he would not be taken for a gang member,
and he was able to learn carpentry then obtain a job at a call
center. Jorge credited his stability to his wife, saying that she
made the difference. Deris was welcomed back to El Salvador by
his mother, who said: “The best thing that could have happened in
my life is for you to have come!” In addition to the support of his
mother, Deris found resources through an organization, Homies
Unidos, dedicated to working with deported gang members (Zilberg 2011). Other deportees created new forms of sociality by:
speaking English at work or with family members, holding barbecues and celebrating U.S. holidays, and hanging out with coworkers
who had also been deported. In these ways, they were able to pretend, at least part of the time, that they were still in the United
States, as shown in the following excerpt of an interview with a
deportee named Roberto:
Susan: So do you, as much as possible, try to make it here
like you’re still there?
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Roberto: Mm-hmm. As much as I can. For example, at the
house, it’s totally 100% English. My sister-in-law, she was
raised in Kentucky too. Her husband, he was raised in L.A.
So her family and me, when we get together, we speak nothing but English. The baby? We don’t talk to him nothing but
English. I mean, he’ll learn Spanish from his Grandma. So, I
try to make it as much as I can. At work [at a call center],
that’s why I love being at work. Then my dad, when we talk
on the phone, it’s English. I just talk Spanish with my
Grandma. And sometimes, I don’t know if you remember,
there’s a lot of helicopters at night. Tch-tch-tch-tch. [Sound of
helicopter.] So right here, sometimes when one passes by, I
just close my eyes and I feel the breeze at night. I could picture I’m [there]. I miss the whole thing a lot.

Other deportees go even further, attempting to return to the
United States without status. Lorenzo resorted to this option,
more than once. After being deported in 2000, he returned to
the United States, where he lived for two years until he was
apprehended for driving without a license. He was deported a
second time, and then in 2004, he once again returned to the
United States, but was apprehended in Texas. Instead of simply
being deported, he was prosecuted for reentry and sentenced to
four years in a federal prison. In 2008, at the time of our interview, he had been deported a third time, and was once again
contemplating returning to his wife and children in the United
States. He explained:
But I’m scared. Because if I get busted crossing, I’m going
back to the BOP [Bureau of Prisons]. For reentry again. This
time, I’m gonna get double time. 8 years. So I really don’t
know what to do. I’m so confused. I need time. I miss my
family so much! I’m really hurt!! For some time, I was drinking a lot here in Salvador, because I was so hurt and confused. ‘I don’t understand why this happened to me! Why?
Why? Why?

Lorenzo’s multiple deportations, coupled with time in federal
prison, and his accusatory question, “Why? Why? Why?” show
the limitations that inmates and deportees face in attempting to
recreate the selves that they were prior to disintegration. Even if
they are successful in rebuilding, the deportation or isolation
practices that tore them apart can be re-initiated at any moment.
As with Lorenzo’s repeated re-entry attempts, the things that
prisoners in solitary confinement do to keep themselves sane
often exacerbate or prolong their harsh conditions of confinement. As Kevin explained:
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Well, I mean, when you—and I’m not saying that they’re conditions of the SHU actually—they’re harsh on the psyche, to
say the very least. It’s extremely hard. And I think that it creates a sense of—you don’t have any control of anything. So in
order for you to feel like you have control, you actually start
to create situations where—splashing police officers with feces
and urine, you know what I mean, you start to really become
savage, almost. And it’s not because that’s how these people
were to begin with, because nobody’s inherently born into
this world with those kinds of thoughts, those kinds of tendencies, and those kinds of actions. It just doesn’t happen.
These are things that are done out of frustration . . . like—the
abuse that the staff actually take out on the individuals, so
they lash out in the only way that they can because they have
no other means of expression.

Even prisoners who survived isolation, or who were eventually released and returned to their communities, described the
effects of isolation as lingering. Kevin said, “Like, I still live with
it on a day-to-day basis. I’m never—somebody—one of my coworkers asked me the other day, how do you deal with your past
and what you’re doing right now? And I say, there’s no difference. I don’t differentiate. My past is still my present. I live with
that every day.” And Max said, “I literally had to train myself, retrain myself, how to speak, how to conduct myself, how to smile.
You understand? And how to greet people. And that was the
most difficult thing I ever had to do. But! I was successful at
doing it.”
Most of the subjects we interviewed did, eventually, find ways
to resist total exclusion. Sometimes they rebuilt new social ties, in
isolation or in El Salvador. Other times, they took actions to challenge exclusionary policies: re-crossing the U.S. border, or splashing prison guards with feces and urine. The desperation of these
acts reveals both the extent of subjects’ exclusion and their eagerness to experience re-inclusion, even into punitive institutions,
undocumented status, or violence at the hands of prison guards.

Conclusion
By tracing the parallel processes of ensnarement, racialization, disintegration, and reconstitution experienced by both isolated prisoners and deported noncitizens, we have endeavored to
describe how individuals experience the newly hybrid civilcriminal sanctions described by crimmigration scholars (e.g.,
Stumpf 2006). This detailed qualitative analysis reveals how punitive this new system is, and it also facilitates a re-examination of
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Table 2. Examples of Disintegrated Subjects
Disintegrated Subject
1. Member of excludable
category
2. Administrative
apparatus ensnares
3. Exclusion and racialization
4. Punishment is absent
5. Disintegration
6. Categorize, exercise
discretion, exclude
7. Power to exclude

Solitarily Confined

Deported

Criminal

Immigrant

Administrative hearing

Inspection, detention,
removal hearing
Racial profiling
Deportation not legally
considered punishment
Removal
Executive Office of
Immigration Review
determination
Power to deport

Gang labeling
Solitary not legally
considered punishment
Isolation
Classification assignment
Power to isolate

how these new sanctions operate, helping to define the kind of
power being exercised, and the kinds of subjects being created.
We have argued here that disintegrated subjects contrast with
juridical and disciplinary subjects in key ways. Unlike juridical subjects of social contracts or disciplinary subjects internalizing state
norms, the disintegrated subjects interviewed for our research
found themselves becoming members of excludable categories,
denied rights or individualized treatment, and subject to exclusion
at the state’s discretion. Though experienced as punitive and
harsh, this exclusion is not technically considered punishment by
the state. Instead of being restored to the social contract or disciplined in ways that produce desired behaviors, disintegrated subjects are placed beyond the boundaries of society, where their
behaviors are ignored—until they find a way to re-cross social
boundaries, that is. Table 2, above, provides a summary of how the
solitarily confined and the deported represent examples of this
new kind of disintegrated subject. By providing this table, we do
not mean to typologize two categories of disintegrated subjects, but
rather to flesh out the characteristics of these subjects in order to
facilitate future research into further examples and more robust
theorizations of this form of subjectification.
Delineating the nature of disintegrated subjects makes three
contributions to understanding state-subject relations in a time of
heightened punitiveness. First, we identify the ways that the
increased use of administrative (or hybrid criminal-civil) sanctions
expands the power of the state. Because they are discretionary
and not deemed to be punitive, administrative sanctions are not
subjected to the same legal constraints and oversights as sanctions
imposed through criminal procedures. Examining this form of
discretionary power is especially important as the number of legal
contexts in which administrative sanctions and categorical exclusions are imposed is increasing. Over the last decade, protestors,
prisoners, immigrants, gang members, the homeless, transgender
people, and welfare recipients have found themselves subject to
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administrative penalties that impose devastating impacts, with few
avenues for resistance or appeal (Beckett and Murakawa 2012;
Gustafson 2011; Gottschalk 2015; Mauer and Chesney-Lind
2003; Mu~
niz 2015; Passavant 2015; Spade 2011). We hope that
future research will examine the production of disintegrated subjects within these and other categories of potential excludability.
Second, attending to the disintegrated subjects created
through exclusionary sanctions reveals how the extreme experiences of isolation and removal redefine less extreme practices as
benefits (mere incarceration rather than solitary confinement, or
living in the United States as an undocumented immigrant rather
than being removed) that can be granted by a “generous” state.
Thus, as deportations skyrocketed and under pressure from
advocates, the Obama administration used deferred action to
enable immigrants who arrived in the United States as children
to remain in the country with work authorization. “Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals” or “DACA” recipients acquired
lawful presence without lawful status. In contrast to those who
are actually deported, DACA recipients became beneficiaries of
the state’s “administrative grace” (see Matter of Compean 2009).
Likewise, the Supreme Court held in Wilkinson v. Austin in
2006 that individuals who are “merely” incarcerated—in language reminiscent of the novel 1984—enjoy a “liberty interest” in
not being further isolated, or in not being placed in solitary confinement. Because of this interest, the Court required that individuals receive certain minimal due process protections prior to
being placed in solitary confinement. Those facing solitary confinement, like those facing deportation, become beneficiaries of
the administrative grace of some procedural protections of their
liberty interest in mere incarceration.
Lynch notes another example of administrative grace in the
context of federal plea bargaining negotiations: “the withholding
of an 851 [a sentencing enhancement that doubles the mandatory
minimum sentences for eligible defendants with prior criminal
histories] was framed [by prosecutors] as a gift to the defendant,
who then had to agree to worse plea conditions than would be
the norm for a similar defendant who was not 851-eligible”
(2016: 123). The contrasts created through administrative sanctions thus enable the state to appear humane, even as it disintegrates some of its subjects.
Third, we speculate that, with the rise of the administrative
state, citizens and the nonincarcerated also become potentially disintegrable subjects. This happens in part because the boundaries
that the state places around those deemed “the worst of the worst”
are porous and unclear. So U.S. citizens have been mistakenly
deported, and young people who are not gang members have
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nonetheless ended up in long-term solitary confinement.8 Moreover, the processes that label some subjects as isolatable gang members and others as deportable aliens produce administrative
systems affecting even those not in isolation, or those not being
deported. For instance, the employer sanctions provisions of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act redefined employment
as something that could only be legal if authorized by the state. As
a result, all employees, including native-born U.S. citizens hired
post-1986, must complete an “I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification” form establishing that their legal status does not preclude
them from working. Likewise, young men of color who are in the
wrong neighborhood at the wrong time, or the wrong prison yard
at the wrong time, might be subject to gang injunctions and gang
labels, regardless of their actual gang membership or lack thereof
(Mu~
niz 2015). Everyone in such locations of potential excludability,
then, must establish his or her nonexcludability.
Disintegration, in both examples, is closely tied to “tenuous
racialized citizenship.”9 People of color in the United States, despite
being formal citizens, experience second-class citizenship, in the
form of police harassment, suspicion, and discrimination (e.g.,
Menjıvar 2016; Mu~
niz 2015). Criminalization and illegalization exaggerate this experience, predominantly affecting people of color, and
stripping convicts and noncitizens of rights to privacy, to work, to
vote, and to serve on juries (e.g., McLennan 2011).
The breadth of this potential criminalization and illegalization
may help to explain the link between punitiveness and nativism,
because the non-incarcerated and citizens may fear being excluded
so much that they work to distinguish themselves from criminals
and the undocumented. This work can include denigrating
“felons” and “illegals,” as occurs all too often through private fears
and in public debates. As a result, the disintegrated subject that lies
at the center of these new hybrid civil-criminal laws, trapped in the
space of non-existence (Coutin 2000), may be none other than the
citizen who used to think that they had rights.
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